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INTRODUCTION
We have now passed the second anniversary date of the most
catastrophic natural disaster and engineering failure in our nation's
history. Hurricane Katrina rolled ashore on August 29, 2005.
When the levees failed, New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana
would be forever changed. Three weeks later, Hurricane Rita-the
third most costly natural disaster in American history-punished
Southwest Louisiana.
In addition to the human loss and physical destruction, these
two storms held a mirror up to the state, and many did not like the
reflection. Rebuild smarter, as well as safer and stronger, became
the clarion call. Fundamental policies and institutions should be
rethought and reshaped as we emerged from the wreckage. Or to
cite LSU Law Center Chancellor Emeritus, John Costonis, this
unprecedented catastrophe "has stimulated unprecedented
receptivity to fresh ideas and fresh solutions for the problems that
the hurricanes mercilessly exposed, but did not create." 1
The first section of this article chronicles policy and planning
successes and shortcomings since the storms. It celebrates the
moments when we seized the opportunity presented by disaster to
enact new approaches to old problems. It uncovers lessons to be
learned. One such lesson is the need to establish recovery entities
that enhance accountability links between policy development and
Copyright 2008, by LOUIStANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. John J. Costonis, Two Years and Counting: Land Use and Louisiana's
Post-Katrina Recovery, 68 LA. L. REv. 349, 349 (2007). This report was funded
by the LRA Support Foundation and appears in this volume of the Louisiana
Law Review.
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program delivery. Another lesson is the importance of early post-
disaster leadership in engaging citizens in planning the rebirth of
their communities.
The sections that follow focus on three challenging issues that
pit the need to change against the tug of the status quo. First,
implementation uncertainties confront South Louisiana as it
attempts to execute infrastructure projects in alignment with its
new regional plan and to alter its development patterns to grow
more safely and toward a more sustainable and insurable future.
Second, unclear policy direction clouds future recovery of the
state's healthcare finance and delivery system. Finally, political
tensions and litigation threaten the renewal and reconstruction of
public housing in New Orleans.
It is too soon to write the history of the recovery. We are in
medias res. This writing is necessarily a single snapshot of the
state's recovery, a single moment in a long journey. Much
progress has been made and more remains to be done. But because
of the undeterred spirit of her people, I am optimistic about the
state's recovery and as committed as ever to the cause of
rebuilding safer, stronger, and smarter.
I. SEVERAL STEPS FORWARD-ONE STEP BACK
In October of 2005, Governor Blanco created by executive
order-later to be enacted in statute-the Louisiana Recovery
Authority (LRA).2  Modeled after the Lower Manhattan
Development Corporation,3 which was created by the state of New
2. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. Exec. Order 2005-63 (West); Louisiana
Recovery Authority Act, 2006 La. Acts No. 5 (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 49:220.1 to .5 (2007)).
3. Like many families in Baton Rouge, we sheltered evacuees and housed
responders coming to the state's aid after Katrina. One such boarder in the
Reilly home was Stefan Pryor, then Executive Director of the Lower Manhattan
Development Corporation. Stefan gave invaluable advice to then Governor
Blanco's Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin and myself on structuring the LRA in
those early, hectic days. Andy Kopplin, of course, became executive director of
the LRA and has worked tirelessly and effectively on all aspects of the recovery.
Thanks also to my wife, Jennifer, who hosted those many relief volunteers, and
to our children, who to this day wonder why they got to sleep in our bedroom
for a month and a halfi
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York in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on Manhattan, the LRA serves as the state's primary planning and
coordinating recovery agency and, as such, is leading one of the
most extensive rebuilding efforts in the world. Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita claimed almost 1,500 Louisiana lives,4 destroyed more
than 200,000 homes and apartments,5 and crippled 18,000
businesses6-more than thirteen times the per-capita losses
suffered in any other domestic catastrophe.7
The LRA's staff and thirty-three member board8-reflective of
the geography, race, and partisanship of the state-has focused on
four primary roles in recover: securing and prioritizing funds
from the federal government, setting rebuilding principles and
4. LA. RECOVERY AuTH., HURRICANE KATRINA ANNIVERSARY DATA FOR
LOUISIANA 1 (2006), available at www.lra.louisiana.gov/assets/Louisiana
KatrinaAnniversaryData082206.pdf.
5. Id. at 9.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Comparison among disasters is not an exact science. However, one
frequently cited statistic is total FEMA dollar commitment per capita. Until
Katrina and Rita, FEMA's costliest disaster was the terrorist attacks of 9/11 at
$390 per capita. Present projected FEMA cost per capita to rebuild post-
hurricane Louisiana is $5,100 and climbing. See LA. RECOVERY AUTH.,
MOVING BEYOND KATRINA AND RITA: RECOVERY DATA INDICATORS FOR
LOUISIANA 3 (2007), available at http://www.Ira.louisiana.gov/assets/twoyear/
Indicators082107.pdf.
8. Board Chair Norman Francis received the Presidential Medal of
Freedom for his work leading the LRA. Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Citations Recipients of the Presidential Medal of
Freedom (Dec. 15, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/12/print/20061215.html. Walter Issacson serves as Vice Chair
and Chief Washington liaison. A full listing of the Board members can be found
at the LRA website and in all of its publications. Louisiana Recovery Authority,
Board of Directors, http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/board.html (last visited Oct.
19, 2007). Some will be cited in this article for their work as Task Force Chairs;
all are volunteer heroes of the recovery.
9. Funding priorities and program execution are not addressed in this
article. It is worth noting, however, that the LRA does not have program
implementation authority. This disconnect, which divorced responsibility for
policy from responsibility for execution, has been cited as a contributing cause
of the implementation problems that have plagued the state's housing assistance
program known as The Road Home. This may be an important lesson learned
for future disaster response. See Michelle Millhollon, Panel Backs LRA 's End,
THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), May 11, 2007, at Al.
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policies, leading long-term regional and local planning, and
ensuring transparency and accountability in the handling of
recovery funds.
To augment its activities and help finance its mission, the LRA
created the LRA Support Foundation, a non-profit entity that raised
private philanthropic dollars for the hiring of planning consultants
and policy experts to advance the recovery.
Charged with advancing policy and planning initiatives that
will rebuild Louisiana safer, stronger, and smarter, the LRA and
the LRA Support Foundation enjoyed early success.
The LRA was active in the first Special Session of the
Legislature called by Governor Blanco in the fall of 2005. One
early victory was the enactment of the first uniform statewide
residential building code in our state's history."' Modeled after the
code enacted by Florida after its series of hurricanes, this code will
serve the state well when future disasters visit Louisiana's shores
and its structures survive. Likewise, in that first special session,
the LRA led the charge to have the state take over the failed public
education system in New Orleans and create a new model allowing
for choice and charter schools in a clear rejection of the pre-storm
status quo. 12  LRA leadership also worked to reform certain
aspects of the state's business tax structure to help stimulate
business activity in the storm-stricken economy and make sure our
10. The LRA Support Foundation was created as a Supporting Organization
within The Baton Rouge Area Foundation (BRAF). BRAF's leadership, John
Davies and John Spain, and BRAF's entire team have been pivotal in garnering
resources and gathering expertise for the work of the LRA and the LRA Support
Foundation. John Laborde serves as Chair of the LRA Support Foundation, and
a full listing of its board members can be found at its website and in all of its
publications. See LRA Support Foundation, Committee Members, http://www.
lrasupportfoundation.org/site/c.gtJVJdMRIsE/b. 1202265ik.A61F/Committee_M
embers.htm. Louisiana's eternal gratitude goes to the many donors who
contributed almost $11 million to the LRA Support Foundation.
11. 2005 La. Acts No. 12. History should record that Governor Blanco and
the legislature produced good results in difficult times in the first post-storm
Special Session.
12. 2005 La. Acts No. 35. LRA Education Task Force Chair Linda Johnson
has been critical to the cause of education reform.
[Vol. 68
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tax code conformed with the recently enacted federal Gulf
Opportunity Zone legislation. 13
Another milestone of that first special session was the creation
of the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) and
the Coastal Protection and Restoration Trust Fund (Coastal Trust
Fund). 14 For the first time ever, Louisiana's policy on hurricane
protection would integrate levees and coastal restoration and
charge a single entity with design and execution. The CPRA's
master plan is complete. 15 It has been well-received and is now
being implemented. Moreover, the Coastal Trust Fund helped our
congressional delegation make the case in Washington for a larger
share of outer continental shelf oil revenues and provides a
constitutionally protected vessel for the income's effective
expenditure. With both pieces in place-the CPRA and the
Coastal Trust fund-a strong accountability link between design
and execution of hurricane protection and coastal restoration was
thereby established at the state level. The Army Corps of
Engineers, of course, has responsibility for the design and
construction of many of the levees that comprise CPRA's master
plan, so constant vigilance will still be required to maintain clear
accountability across state and federal jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, in the second post-storm Special Session of the
Legislature in the winter of 2006, the state missed an opportunity
to clearly delineate responsibility for its housing recovery
programs and strengthen accountability for their delivery.
Legislation that would have created the Louisiana Land and
13. See generally DEP'T OF LA. ECON. DEV., GULF OPPORTUNITY ZONE ACT
OF 2005: LOUISIANA ECONOMIC IMPACT (2006), available at http://www.
lded.state.la.us/uploads/pdf/GulfOpportunityZoneActof2OO5.pdf (detailing the
effect of the legislation on Louisiana). LRA Economic Development Task
Force Chair Matt Stuller led this effort.
14. 2005 La. Acts No. 8 (creating the CPRA); 2005 La. Acts No. 69
(proposing a constitutional amendment to Louisiana Constitutional article VII,
sections 10, 10.2, and 10.5) (approved by popular vote, allowing certain federal
revenues to be dedicated to coastal restoration).
15. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., INTEGRATED
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION AND HURRICANE PROTECTION: LOUISIANA'S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2007). Execution
of this plan is enhanced by clear delineation of responsibilities and strong public
backing. Full funding, however, remains a challenge.
2008]
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Housing 6Trust failed to pass in the waning moments of the
session.'1 Managed by housing professionals, this trust would
have had primary responsibility for crafting procedures that
effectively execute the homeowner and rental assistance programs
and contracting with public and private entities for their
implementation. This trust would also have served as the sole
repository of land sold to the state under its homeowner assistance
program, and as such, would have established policies and
procedures for the ultimate disposition of those properties. As a
result of the failure of this legislation, the state resorted to a
patchwork of existing and new agencies to execute its housing
programs. 17 Consequently, there have been delays, implementation
frustrations, and much finger pointing.
That second Special Session was not without its victories,
however. There was a post-storm hue and cry in New Orleans to
restructure some of the city's long neglected civic institutions. The
LRA worked with reform-minded and change-oriented New
Orleanians to consolidate and reform the region's broken and
Byzantine system of levee boards.' 8 Legislation in that Regular
Session also consolidated the New Orleans assessor's offices and
the city's fractured system of civil and criminal courts. 19
In the months that followed, LRA staff worked diligently with
Parish officials toward the adoption of the new FEMA Advisory
Base Flood Elevation guidelines, and those guidelines have been
adopted in every devastated coastal parish. The guidelines require
raising new houses and buildings to reduce future flooding. The
slogan, "safer, stronger, smarter," was no longer merely rhetorical.
Insurability in coastal Louisiana remains a key factor in its
recovery. Enactment of building codes and adherence to the base
16. S.B. 49, 1st Ex. Sess. (La. 2006).
17. These included, for example, the Division of Administration, the Office
of Community Development, ICF International, the Louisiana Housing Finance
Agency, The Road Home Corporation (later renamed The Louisiana Land
Trust), and the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.
18. 2006 La. Acts No. 1. State Senator Walter Boasso authored the levee
board consolidation legislation. His meetings with Secretary of Transportation
John Bradberry, Secretary of Natural Resources Scott Angle, and I contributed
to its formulation.
19. 2006 La. Acts No. 863 (consolidating the court system).
336 [Vol. 68
FINDING SIL VER LININGS
flood elevations as lynchpins of risk mitigation has critical long-
term implications for the availability and affordability of insurance
in the region.
So do other directional aspects of insurance policy. The LRA
endorsed and helped advocate the abolition of the state's
anachronistic Insurance Rating Commission.20 The only such
commission in the country, its activities had retarded private
underwriting in the state. In addition, the LRA Support
Foundation funded a study of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe
Fund to determine its suitability for Louisiana. 2 1 That study helped
guide policymakers away from greater state intervention as the
answer to Louisiana's insurance problems and toward more
market-driven solutions enacted in the 2007 Regular Session of the
Legislature. Work remains in this area, but Louisiana's policy
direction is clearly and rightly directed at expanding private
insurance capacity.
22
In the spring of 2006, the LRA Support Foundation funded
successful planning efforts in Calcasieu, Vermillion, and St.
Bernard Parishes. Renowned disaster recovery planner Andres
Duany led planning workshops-or charrettes-in these
communities, giving citizens a voice in the rebuilding of their
neighborhoods and helping local elected officials prioritize
recovery projects, modernize their land use and zoning codes,
20. Press Release, Louisiana Recovery Authority, Louisiana Speaks Update:
Key Recommendations from Regional Plan Accomplished this Session (Jun. 29,
2007), available at http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/prO629071aspeaks.html (expressing
support for the Insurance Rating Commission's abolition); 2007 La. Acts No. 459.
21. PARAGON STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS, LOUISIANA RECOVERY AUTHORITY,
LOUISIANA CATASTROPHE FUND ANALYSIS (2007). A Catastrophe Fund is a
state-backed and run reinsurance pool or re-insurer of last resort-as
distinguished from Citizen's Insurance, the state's insurer of last resort.
22. Compare REINSURANCE ASs'N OF AM., GOVERNMENT CATASTROPHE
FUNDS: AN IDEA THAT'S BAD FOR AMERICA'S INSUREDS (2006), available at
http://www.reinsurance.org/files/public/govtcatfunds.pdf, with Matt Reed,
Florida Overhauls Home Insurance Rules, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 2007, at B6,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/insurance/2007-0 1-25-
florida-insurance-reformsx.htm?csp=34. Florida has taken a different direction.
By greatly expanding the reach of its insurer of last resort and financially
interlocking it with the state's Catastrophe Fund, Florida has created what many
describe as an actuarial time bomb that poses great potential risk to the state's
fiscal future and discourages private underwriting.
2008]
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develop mitigation strategies, and designate green spaces. 23 Strong
leadership from the mayor and other local elected officials during
the Lake Charles charrette is particularly noteworthy for bringing
that community together and placing the recovery of Lake Charles
on an upward trajectory.24
An added value of these charrettes came in giving citizens
returning to these communities a renewed dream of a shared future
together and guidance on where and how safe rebuilding would
take place. This process helped many make the decision to move
to higher ground. For some this meant moving within their pre-
storm parish; for others it meant relocating to a different parish.25
Regardless of where a former resident chooses to move, early post-
disaster planning that aids citizens in their individual recovery
choices must be deemed a success.
23. Copies of these reports and plans can be found at the website of Louisiana
Speaks, the primary long-term community planning initiative of the LRA, at
www.louisianaspeaks.org. A true citizen-driven planning effort, thousands
contributed to the success of these charrettes, but some deserve special
recognition-Elizabeth "Boo" Thomas and her team at the Center for Planning
Excellence, and Donna Fraiche, Chair of the LRA's Long-Term Community
Planning Task Force. Two other outstanding planning documents produced by
Urban Design Associates for Louisiana Speaks are available on the website,
Louisiana Speaks, Pattern Book, http://www.louisianaspeaks.org/static.html?
id=39 (last viewed Oct. 19, 2007), and Louisiana Speaks, Tool Kit,
http://www.louisianaspeaks.org/static.html?id=87 (last viewed Oct. 19, 2007).
24. I had the privilege of addressing the final day's session of the Lake
Charles charrette. Mayor Roach's leadership was outstanding. At that very
meeting, the City Council formally adopted Mayor Roach's model code and land
use recommendations developed during the three week charrette. At its
conclusion, the nearly one thousand citizens in attendance broke into spontaneous
applause. Lanny Keller, Rita "s Ruin Make Room for Progress in Lake Charles,
THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Feb. 14, 2006 at B7. Within months, the city's
voters approved a $25 million bond issue to implement portions of the plan.
25. For example, current statistics show that roughly a third of St. Bernard
homeowners have opted to sell under the Road Home plan and relocate within the
state. I was privileged to address the opening and closing sessions of the St.
Bernard charrette. St. Bernard was, per capita, the most devastated parish, with
virtually every home damaged or destroyed. Understandably, at times the
charrette sessions were tense. In the end, citizens expressed gratitude for receiving
invaluable advice as they made their personal recovery decisions. And while it
has not yet been reflected in the aggregate economic statistics because of
population loss, St. Bernard's recovery plans have it pointed in the right direction.
[Vol. 68
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Unfortunately, the planning process in New Orleans was one of
fits and starts. 2v The Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) was
ultimately developed with funding pulled together with help from
the LRA Board and its staffs technical support. 27 UNOP represents
one of the largest urban planning efforts ever and has been approved
by the New Orleans City Council and the LRA Board. Nonetheless,
some view its results as mixed. A May 2007 research report from
the New Orleans Bureau of Governmental Research notes that the
recovery plan for New Orleans continues to suffer from, among
other shortcomings, a "failure to connect flood risk with policy" and
the lack of a clear "direction for rebuilding. 28
Research reports on the status of the recovery published by the
Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government and the Public
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana (PAR) cite the following
lessons to be learned in disaster response:
" The longer a community waits to develop a specific
recovery plan, the more likely residents will take
matters into their own hands, and the rebuilding will
be haphazard.
" Recovery efforts have advanced the most in those
communities where officials have provided clear,
specific direction and encouraged public input and
participation.29
26. Early planning efforts failed to include the Urban Land Institute's plan,
which produced a much vilified purple map designating neighborhoods as green
spaces without engaging neighborhood residents in the determinations and
deliberations. Editorial, Not Coming Together, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), June 18, 2006, at Metro 6. Planning efforts of the mayor's Bring New
Orleans Back Commission ultimately never got off the ground due to the
mayor's ambivalence and to lack of funding. Karen Turni Bazile, Residents
Discuss Concerns with Council, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 2,
2004, at Metro 3.
27. The planning process for New Orleans owes much to a leadership grant
from The Rockefeller Foundation and hard work by LRA Board Member David
Voelker.
28. BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH, UNOP REVISITED: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE REVISED CITYWIDE PLAN 1 (2007).
29. KAREN ROWLEY, GULFGOV REPORTS: A YEAR AND A HALF AFTER
KATRINA AND RITA, AN UNEVEN RECOVERY vii (2007).
2008]
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The report concludes that long delayed planning and lack of
specific direction from New Orleans officials has hampered the
city's recovery.
30
II. WALK THE WALK
In the spring of 2006, the LRA Support Foundation funded and
launched the most comprehensive post-disaster regional planning
effort in our nation's history. The impact of the storms was felt
from the Texas line to the Pearl River-and while the effects were
most obvious in those parishes immediately in the path of
destruction, thoughtful planning was also required in "host"
parishes further inland with an eye toward big regional
transportation infrastructure, coastal protection and restoration, and
future living patterns.
The Louisiana Speaks Regional Plan31 was developed over a
year of extensive public input and outreach facilitated and refined
by the most respected regional planning team in the country. 32 The
plan calls for specific transportation, transit, and infrastructure
projects that advance safer and smarter growth for the region. It
asks South Louisiana to think about big infrastructure regionally
rather than parochially that stops at the parish line. Its
recommendations are thorough and thoughtful; its conclusions are
profound.
South Louisiana faces a critical choice with regard to future
development and infrastructure investments-whether to move
toward higher density development and urban infill on higher,
safer, and more insurable ground, or to continue to sprawl ever
farther into harm's way on lower-lying wetlands or otherwise
ecologically sensitive and hurricane-vulnerable tracts. Louisiana
can steer public and private infrastructure investments in one
direction or the other-toward "smart growth" as called for in the
Louisiana Speaks Plan or toward the haphazard status quo.
30. Id.
31. LA. RECOVERY AuTH., LOUISIANA SPEAKS REGIONAL PLAN: VISION
AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH IN SouTH LOUISIANA (2007)
[hereinafter LOUISIANA SPEAKS REGIONAL PLAN].
32. The team was lead by Peter Calthorpe and John Fregonese, with
guidance and support from Boo Thomas and Donna Fraiche. See supra note 23.
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The clear challenge for the Louisiana Speaks Plan is
implementation. Louisiana does not have an imbedded culture of
effective planning at any level. And those local, "home rule," or
other statutes that govern our current zoning and planning are
children "of the era of speakeasies, Huey Long, and Herbert
Hoover." 33 The challenge is compounded by a bias against state
mandates or "regionalism" that might tread on long established
local control over land use and zoning.34
To increase the odds of effective implementation, Louisiana
Speaks has made the creation of a revamped and more robust
Office of State Planning its number one priority. The primary
charge of this office would be to drive development in concert with
the regional plan. It would be empowered to coordinate and plan
state capital outlays and large transportation initiatives as well as
provide technical planning assistance and model codes to local
jurisdictions. Giving Louisiana Speaks some needed momentum,
the legislature passed a concurrent resolution in the 2007 Regular
Session calling for a task force to make recommendations for the
Office of State Planning and to report back in time to take action in
the 2008 Regular Session.
35
Also increasing the odds of implementation is a group of other
key recommendations of Louisiana Speaks that are discernibly
"carrot" rather than "stick" in nature. For example, another plan
priority is the creation of Model Development and Zoning
Codes-but with the proviso that these Codes serve as templates,
not dictum.36  Similarly, the recommendation to establish a
Conservation and Mitigation Trust Fund to purchase high-risk and
ecologically sensitive land calls not for taking property, but rather,
for compensation in the form of voluntary sales or tax incentives if
large tract owners allow conservation easements.
37
As a state, we can change our planning and land use practices
to grow "smarter" and in a way that leads us to a safer, stronger
future. Public outreach and polling involving over 27,000 citizen
33. Costonis, supra note 1, at 349-50.
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. H.R. Con. Res. 229, 2007 Reg. Sess. (La. 2007).
36. LOUIsIANA SPEAKS REGIONAL PLAN, supra note 3 1, at 64.
37. Id. at 59-61.
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responses as part of the Louisiana Speaks process showed
overwhelming support for change in our development patterns,
including a strong preference for higher density and a willingness
to accept certain tradeoffs between property rights and hazard
mitigation measures. 38 But we must choose our direction soon, or
temptation for business as usual will overwhelm the post-storm
momentum for change.
III. HEAL THYSELF
In light of the damage wrought by Katrina to the healthcare
delivery system in New Orleans and the subsequent rippling
stresses placed on providers elsewhere in the state,39 the LRA
Support Foundation hired PricewaterhouseCoopers to undertake
the most exhaustive analysis ever conducted of the state's
healthcare system and to make recommendations on how to bring
it back.40 The findings of the PwC Report are inescapable.
Detrimental to the health of all Louisianans, the state has been
running a dual system of healthcare, wherein uninsured patients
receive care in a system of ten state-run, Depression-era charity
hospitals and insured patients receive care from private
providers. 41  Moreover, Louisiana's model of state-run charity
hospitals-unique among the fifty states-was in crisis before the
storms. Since more than one in five adults in Louisiana lacked
42health insurance, too many of our citizens were denied primary
care, sought it in public emergency rooms, or both.
As a consequence, statistically, our health outcomes, access to
care, and levels of care rank at or near the bottom of the fifty states
by almost every indication.43 Louisiana has been deemed the
"least healthy state" in the country in rankings published by the
38. Id. at 49-50.
39. Id. at 13.
40. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, REPORT ON LOUISIANA HEALTHCARE
DELIVERY AND FINANCING SYSTEM (2006), available at http://www.lra.
louisiana.gov/assets/PwChealthcarereport427061.pdf [hereinafter PwC REPORT].
41. Id. at 21.
42. PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH LAB, LOUISIANA HEALTH INSURANCE
SURVEY 9 (2004).
43. PwC REPORT, supra note 40, at 80-87.
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United Health Foundation in fifteen of the last seventeen years-in
the other two years the state was ranked forty-ninth.4  These
rankings persist in spite of relatively high per capita healthcare
expenditures.45 Compared to other states, Louisiana spends more
and gets less for its healthcare dollar.
Louisiana State University is charged with managing our ten
state hospitals, together known as the charity system. In addition
to its role in providing healthcare to the uninsured, Louisiana's
charity system also provides the bulk of the facility-based training
and education of medical and allied health professionals,
particularly for LSU's medical school and graduate medical
education programs. This dual role has taken its toll on both
missions. Compounding the dismal health statistics cited above,
Louisiana suffered from a lack of primary care physicians in rural
and underserved areas and severe shortages of allied health
professionals before the storms.46
The hurricanes exposed these shortcomings and amplified them
to crisis levels. Katrina took the two charity and LSU medical
school facilities in New Orleans out of commission and, with them,
almost 900 acute care beds and one of the state's two level-one
trauma centers.47 Today, the New Orleans region is critically short
of doctors and nurses. Moreover, because the state has no ongoing
mechanism to reimburse private providers for their care of tens of
thousands of uninsureds since the storms, the community and
private hospitals in the region are on the brink of fiscal collapse.
The governor and the legislature have steered federal funding to
private providers to help stem the red ink, but these are band-aids.
A systemic solution is required.
44. PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., INC., REALIGNING
CHARITY HEALTH CARE AND MEDICAL EDUCATION IN LOUISIANA 5 (2007),
available at http://www.la-par.org/Publications/PDF/RealigningCharity May_
2007.pdf [hereinafter PAR REPORT].
45. Id. at 9.
46. Id. at 5. Studies also show that the LSU medical school fails to qualify
for an estimated $160 million in available federal funding because its physicians
in training are not exposed to Medicare patients who seek their treatment in the
private facilities. Id. at 18.
47. PwC REPORT, supra note 40, at 14, 59.
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Both the PwC Report and the PAR Report conclude that
Louisiana must reform its system of health care delivery and
financing to bring more insurance coverage to its uninsured and
allow state allocated federal Medicaid dollars to flow through the
patient to whatever qualified healthcare provider the patient
chooses-public or private. 48  This would result in better
integration of uninsured care across the public and private
healthcare sectors and increased access to neighborhood clinics,
thereby increasing the availability of more primary and preventive
care for our citizens.
PAR also recommends that the LSU Health Sciences Center,
rather than operating ten charity model hospitals, focus on running
four university research hospitals centering excellence on
treatment and research specialties. 49 This would result in better
integration of its education mission across public and private
providers and a more sustainable patient mix for the system's long-
term fiscal health. This model already exists both within the
system and within the state at the LSU Health Sciences Center in
Shreveport, so it is no great leap to suggest taking this model to the
other metro LSU Health Sciences Center facilities and aligning our
delivery of medical education and uninsured care with the other
forty-nine states. PAR concludes that the remaining state-run
charity hospitals should devolve to local control and governance-
also more in step with all other states.
50
Louisiana is at a critical juncture in its healthcare debate. We
can choose reform or status quo. This debate is playing out in the
controversy over the size and scope of a potential new facility for
the LSU Health Sciences Center in New Orleans.51 But regardless
of how the brick and mortar questions are answered, we have no
choice but to move to the financial and delivery model advocated
above. The best case completion date for a new facility for LSU
Medical Center in New Orleans is 2014, and solving the
48. Id. at 20-21. See also PAR REPORT, supra note 44, at 2, 3.
49. PAR REPORT, supra note 44, at 2, 3.
50. Id. at 2-3, 22-24.
51. Healthcare reform has been consistently championed by many LRA
Board Members, but none more forcefully than LRA Healthcare Task Force
Chair Kim Boyle.
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uncompensated care problems facing the region's private providers
will not wait. More importantly, our citizens throughout the state
should not have to wait for better healthcare.
IV. MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT
Katrina and Rita damaged over 80,000 units of rental housing
in South Louisiana. 52  The sheer number makes rebuilding
daunting enough; but the challenge of bringing back public
assistance housing in New Orleans is exponentially greater. In a
politically-charged and racially-tense environment where trust is in
short supply, a debate is raging between those who would simply
patch up the public housing in New Orleans and those who see a
historic opportunity to rectify a housing model that has failed
tenants and neighborhoods alike. The debate has been
characterized by some observers as "build it right or build it
fast.",5 3  However, the underlying philosophical divide between
those espousing business as usual and those for rebuilding better
runs far deeper.
Again, Katrina merely exposed a dire preexisting condition.
Many tenants in New Orleans public housing tolerated conditions
that were among the nation's worst. The Housing Authority of
New Orleans (HANO) ran a little over 8,400 public housing units,
almost eighty percent of which were in nine large projects with
vacancy rates, according to U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) numbers, approaching fifty percent. 54
Furthermore, for "more than 30 years, HUD had rated HANO as
one of the country's worst-performing housing authorities and the
52. LA. RECOVERY AuTH., supra note 4, at 9.
53. See generally Laura Maggi & Gwen Filosa, A Grand Scheme for
Reinventing Public Housing Is in the Works but Displaced Residents Want
Action Now, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 18, 2006, at National 1
(insightful framing of debate); Richard A. Webster, A House Divided.- Housing
Authority of New Orleans, NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus., Aug. 20, 2007 (providing
a sense of political passion and racial intensity enveloping this issue).
54. SUSAN J. POPKIN, MARGERY A. TURNER & MARTHA BURT, THE URBAN
INST., REBUILDING AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEW ORLEANS: THE CHALLENGE
OF CREATING INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES 2 (2006), available at http://www.urban.
org/UPLOADEDPDF/900914_affordablehousing.pdf.
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agency was under HUD receivership at the time of the
hurricane."
55
The city's public housing projects isolated tenants from the rest
of the city, concentrating poverty and compounding racial
56segregation. Dating back to the Depression and World War II,
these developments were physically dilapidated and, in many
cases, pockets of despair and distress before Katrina. Their blight
often spilled over into surrounding neighborhoods.57 Plagued by
the full panoply of societal ills--crime, drugs, multigenerational
poverty-the old model of federally owned and operated public
housing was broken in New Orleans.
The LRA designed its programs to bring back affordable rental
housing in a manner that does not recreate the past. While not
exclusively targeted at public housing, The LRA's Housing Task
Force looked to successful developments in other cities that have
transformed public housing-like the widely acclaimed Eastlake
development in Atlanta. 58  Instead of rebuilding a few large
projects all destined for very low-income tenants, the goal is a
balanced mix of deeply subsidized, affordable, and market rate
units run by for-profit and not-for-profit developers in healthy
mixed income communities spread throughout the metropolitan
region. This way, replicating the excessive pre-storm
concentrations of poverty can be avoided.
To finance this type of development, the LRA created its
"Piggyback Program" whereby Low Income Housing Tax Credits
are added to or "piggybacked" with Community Development
Block Grants and awarded to developers in a competitive process
administered by the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency. HUD
supports this approach, and through HANO has successfully
secured Piggyback Program funding and selected several non-
profit developers to bring the Eastlake model to four New Orleans
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id.
58. LRA Housing Task Force Chair Walter Leger and Human Services
Chair Dr. Calvin Mackie provided leadership on this issue. On separate
occasions both Dr. Mackie and I have visited Eastlake.
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public housing complexes, including the St. Bernard housing
project adjacent to City Park.5 9
Unfortunately, national and local tenant advocacy groups have
a different vision for New Orleans public housing--one of rapidly
rehabbing and reoccupying. They cite the need to get former
residents back quickly and argue that tenants retain vested
leasehold rights. But their fundamental objections run deeper.
They simply don't believe the future includes them. Tenant
advocates claim that "mixed-income" is euphemistic for
gentrification, that former tenants will not have reserved units at
affordable rents in new developments. 60  Their opposition to
HUD's plans has sparked angry meetings, protests, and lawsuits
that threaten to derail the demolition, renewal, and reconstruction
of St. Bernard and other housing projects.6'
A lack of trust between former residents and their advocates on
one hand, and HUD officials and their developers on the other, has
made reasoned discussion and mediation difficult. While some
progress has been made, 62 as this goes to press, many issues
remain unresolved. One thing is certain. If New Orleans is to ever
fully recover and enjoy a brighter future for all its citizens,
rebuilding its public housing to avoid the mistakes of the past must
be part of the equation.
59. I have had the privilege of working with the Forekids! Foundation in
New Orleans and BRAF's real estate development affiliate, Commercial
Properties Development Corporation, on a compelling vision to bring back the
golf facilities in City Park and the adjacent St. Bernard housing project in a
fashion directly modeled after the renewal of the Eastlake housing projects and a
formerly rundown golf course in central Atlanta. The Eastlake Foundation's
golf course now serves as home to the PGA Tour's Tour Championship, and
revenues from the event and the golf course help fund community and resident
services in the affordable housing development nearby.
60. The River Gardens complex, an earlier mixed-income development that
replaced the St. Thomas housing project, enflamed this debate and incited
litigation. Maggi & Filosa, supra note 53.
61. Laura Maggi, HUD Considers Phased Redevelopment-Some Public
Housing Units Could Reopen, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 20,
2006, at Metro 1.
62. Id.
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CONCLUSION
This has been an opportunity to look back at what has worked
and what needs more work. It has been an opportunity to look
ahead to the challenges confronting full recovery. And I commend
the Louisiana Law Review for devoting this volume to both the
broad policy issues and narrow legal questions that bear on our
recovery.
Reflecting on the second anniversary of Katrina and Rita, I am
certainly proud of the role the Louisiana Recovery Authority has
played in bringing our state back to this point. But I am even more
proud of the work of the thousands of our citizens who participated
in planning charrettes, the thousands of our citizens who have
tirelessly volunteered their time and efforts to the recovery, and the
hundreds of thousands of South Louisiana residents who labor
daily to put their lives and communities back together.
At this point in time, our recovery is not geographically even;
indeed, it is the tale of two recoveries. A recent LRA report on job
creation and business vitality shows Southwest Louisiana
surpassing pre-Rita levels and Southeast Louisiana, notably New
Orleans and St. Bernard, still dramatically lagging behind pre-
Katrina levels.63  Nevertheless, I remain optimistic about our
shared future in Louisiana.
Tough decisions and unfinished business remain. But as long
as we continue to reflect on lessons learned-as long as our hearts
and minds remain open to new and better ways--our spirit will
prevail.
63. See generally DEK TERRREL & RYAN BILBO, LA. RECOVERY AUTH., A
REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON LOUISIANA
BUSINESSES: 2005Q2-2006Q4 (2007), available at http://www.bus.lsu.edu/
centers/ded/PPRL%20report_2006Q2_FINAL.pdf.
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